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CONFLICT OF LAWS-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
ELLIOTT E. CHEATHAM*






V. STATE SEIZURE OF INTANGIBLES
I. JURISDICTION OF COURTS
1. Non-Resident Motorists.-The statute subjecting non-residents to
suit in Tennessee for injuries inflicted within the state has been
extended by interpretation to non-resident parents who join in their
minor child's application for a driver's license. In Leggett v. Cross-
noe1 the parents of a minor under eighteen years joined with the
minor in his application for a driver's license, as required by Tennes-
see Code Annotated section 54-704. The minor, driving a car owned
by a third person, ran down and killed a child on a Tennessee high-
way. The child's administrator brought an action for the death
against the minor, the owner of the car, and the parents of the minor
who were residents of Kentucky. The administrator had process
served on the parents in Kentucky through the Secretary of State of
Tennessee as provided by the non-resident motorists statute. The
parents pleaded in abatement that their joinder in the application for
their son's driver's license did not bring them within the Tennessee
statute on service of process on non-residents, so the original process,
and "alias" process served on them within Tennessee, were void. The
non-resident motorists statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section
20-2244, provides that "any nonresident . . . who shall . . . procure
the use of a motor vehicle licensed under the laws of this state ...
to operate such vehicle on highway or highways within the state"
shall be subject to suit under the statute. The supreme court, speak-
ing through Justice Tomlinson, held the parents were subject to suit
and to service of process.2 Justice Tomlinson relied on the precise
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; former President, Association of
American Law Schools; co-editor, Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold and Reese,
Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws (4th ed. 1957).
1. 336 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1960).
2. Though subject to service of process the parents were held not liable
for the accident, as the son had given the proof of financial responsibility
called for by TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-704 (Supp. 1961).
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words of the statute, "who shall . . . procure the use of a motor
vehicle." He relied strongly also on "the purpose of the non-resident
service of process statute," stressing that the statute "was intended
to better afford in Tennessee Courts the enforcement of civil remedies
to injured parties against non-residents who might be liable under
Tennessee law for those injuries."
2. Watercraft.-The principle of the non-resident motorists statutes
has been applied to watercraft by a statute3 entitled "Operation of
watercraft in state as appointment of agent for process":
The operation, navigation or maintenance by a nonresident or non-
residents of a boat, ship, barge or other watercraft in the state, either in
person or through others, . . . shall be deemed thereby to constitute
an appointment. .. of the secretary of state ... to be the true and lawful
agent . . . for service of process . .. in any suit, action or proceeding
against such nonresident or nonresidents growing out of any accident or
injury in which such nonresident or nonresidents may be involved while,
either in person or through others, operating, navigating or maintaining
a boat, ship, barge or other watercraft in the state ....
The note to the code section indicates that six other states have
similar statutes. The new legislation touches one of the most vexed
areas in American law, navigable waters and the adjustment of
federal admiralty jurisdiction with state jurisdiction. The statute
does not assume to make Tennessee substantive law apply to the
accident or injury. It deals only with the subjection of the non-resi-
dent to suit in the courts of Tennessee.
II. TORTS
In two cases the court of appeals dealt with out-of-state accidents.
The principal question was whether the law of the place of the
occurrence should be used, or the law of Tennessee since it was the
state of the forum.
In Capital Airlines v. Barger,4 an airplane had crashed in Michigan
killing all persons in it. The Tennessee administratrix of a passenger
sued for his death under the wrongful death statute of Michigan,
alleging negligence of the defendant airline in several particulars.
The evidence did not reveal the cause of the accident. The evidence
did show that the plane while circling the field at which it was
about to land suddenly nosed down at a sharp angle and crashed.
The plaintiff recovered a verdict of $110,000 at a second trial. The
defendant appealed on several grounds including insufficiency of the
3. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-231 to -234 (Supp. 1961).
4. 341 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
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evidence and excessiveness of recovery. The court, through Judge
Hamilton, upheld the plaintiff's contention that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applied and affirmed the finding of liability of the
defendant. Dealing with the law of Tennessee on the subject, the
court rejected Tennessee decisions of 1935 and 1943 to the effect that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to airplane crashes.
The court reasoned that those decisions were reached in the "adoles-
cent stages" of air transportation. It announced as the law of the
state that "the principles governing liability of other common car-
riers should now be equally applicable to transport airplanes operat-
ing as such." In considering the conflict of laws question-whether
the law of Tennessee or the law of another state should be used-the
Court quoted a learned opinion by Judge (now Justice) Felts on the
nature of res ipsa loquitur as a principle of circumstantial evidence.
It held the law of the forum should be used because the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur has been recognized in Tennessee as a rule of evi-
dence, and the controlling conflict of laws principle is that questions
of evidence are governed by the law of the forum. The measure of
recovery, however, was held to be governed by the law of the state of
Michigan, the statutes and decisions of which were considered. Ac-
cording to these statutes and decisions, the lack of a loving relation-
ship between the passenger and his surviving wife was relevant to the
amount of the recovery, and the exclusion of evidence on this point
by the trial judge was found to be erroneous. Instead of ordering a
new trial for the error, the court of appeals directed a remittitur of
$12,500 conditional on acceptance by the plaintiff; this the court felt
would do substantial justice and avoid a third trial. Interest on the
amount of the verdict was computed under Tennessee law, running
from the date of the judgment overruling the motion for a new trial.
Camurati v. Sutton5 involved an unusual accident arising from a
Ford's fear of a Cadillac. On a two lane highway in Mississippi a
few miles south of the Tennessee line, a Ford car going south and a
Cadillac going north approached a bridge together. The Ford, veering
too far to its right from the center of the road, struck the bridge
abutment on its side of the bridge and was demolished. The Cadillac
swerved when its brakes were applied but never struck the Ford.
The owner and occupants of the Ford sued the driver and the owner
of the Cadillac for personal injuries and destruction of the car. The
ground of the action was that the Cadillac was in the wrong lane
as the cars approached the bridge and the Ford veered to the right
and struck the bridge abutment to prevent what otherwise would
have been a headon collision. The plaintiff relied on and proved the
5. 342 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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Mississippi statutes which embody the comparative negligence princi-
ple as well as the direction that "all questions of negligence and
contributory negligence shall be for the jury to determine." The jury
gave a verdict for the plaintiffs. On appeal the defendants urged
that there was no evidence to support the verdict. At the trial the
plaintiffs stated that the Cadillac was in the wrong lane as it ap-
proached the bridge; the driver of the Cadillac and a companion
stated the opposite. A state highway patrolman testified from notes
made at the scene before the cars were moved that skid marks showed
the Cadillac was in its proper lane as the cars approached the bridge.
The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge Avery, held the physical
facts testified to by the patrolman made the oral testimony for the
plaintiffs of no value, and it reversed the trial court and gave judg-
ment for the defendant. The court of appeals assumed that as Mis-
sissippi was the place of the occurrence, the Mississippi law of
comparative negligence should govern. On the role of the judge and
the jury it found that Mississippi as well as Tennessee law would
call for a reversal where "there is no legal doubt as to the conclusions
to be drawn from the whole evidence upon the issues." But in de-
termining that the physical facts testified to by the patrolman over-
rode the oral testimony of the plaintiffs and in considering what
amounts to "material evidence" supporting the plaintiffs' claim, the
court relied wholly on Tennessee authorities.
The conflict of laws rule indicating the matters on which the forum
should use its local law employs the confusing pair of terms, sub-
stance and procedure: matters of procedure are governed by the law
of the forum, matters of substance are governed by the law governing
the occurrence. The same pair of terms, substance-procedure, is used
to mark numerous different distinctions in the law. It is all too easy
to cite cases that call a matter substance or procedure for one of
these purposes as controlling for a wholly different purpose.6 The
two Tennessee cases here discussed involve the conflict of laws dis-
tinction in the perplexing matters of res ipsa loquitur and the suffici-
ency of evidence. The guides to decision, of course, are the policies
of conflict of laws relevant to the particular conflict of laws question
presented. The best discussion of the matter is a closely analytical
article by Professor Morgan on "Choice of Law Governing Proof."7
6. A most discerning treatment of the subject is in Cook, "Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933), reprinted in
COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BAsES OF CONFLICT OF LAws ch. VI (1942).
The author points out eight different legal problems in which "this dis-
tinction [between substance and procedure] is drawn for a number of
different purposes, each involving its own social, economic, or political
problem."
7. 58 HAR. L. REv. 153 (1944).
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After considering carefully the policies in conflict of laws Professor
Morgan states his conclusion: 8
It is time to abandon both the notion and the expression that matters
of procedure are governed by the law of the forum. It should be frankly
stated that (1) the law of the locus is to be applied to all matters of
substance except where its application will violate the public policy of
the forum; and (2) the law of the locus is to be applied to all such
matters of procedure as are likely to have a material influence upon the
outcome of litigation except where (a) its application will violate the
public policy of the forum or (b) weighty practical considerations
demand the application of the law of the forum.
In both Tennessee cases discussed the court assumed that the sub-
stantive law used would be that of the place of the occurrence, and
most American decisions so hold. In recent years a few courts have
come to hold that particular aspects of the plaintiff's cause of action
should be governed by a different law. So it has been held that in
intra-farnily accidents the privilege of one member of a family to
sue another member should be governed by the law of the family
domicile.9 In a dictum the majority of the Court of Appeals of New
York stated that the law of the place of an airplane crash, Massachu-
setts, should not be used to limit narrowly the amount of recovery in
a death action.10 Instead, the court applied the law of New York,
which was the place of the decedent's domicile and the place where
the ticket was bought and the flight commenced, as well as the
forum. In stating this view the opinion ostensibly relied on the old
principles that matters of procedure are governed by the law of the
forum and that a state will not apply a foreign law that is contrary
to its strong public policy. The real ground for the dictum, however,
seems to be the emerging conflict of laws principle that the elements
of a tort should be governed by the law of the state with which the
occurrence has the most significant relationship for the particular
matter in issue."
III. SUPPORT
In Thomas v. Thomas12 a woman had been granted a divorce in
Tennessee and custody of the children of the marriage, with a decree
of support for the children against the father but with it a right of
visitation in the father. The wife remarried and moved to Texas
8. Id. at 195.
9. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
10. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34 (1961).
11. This is the direction in which the conflict of laws as to contracts is
moving. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFUICT OF LAWS § 332ff (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1960); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105.
12. 335 S.W.2d 827 (Tenn. 1960).
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with her second husband. The father claimed he was relieved of his
obligation under the decree to support the children as the mother's
move to Texas deprived him of his visitation privileges. The supreme
court unanimously held the obligation of support under the decree
continued. Chief Justice Prewitt stated that the first husband could
not "force the mother to leave her second husband and return to
Tennessee" with the children by a threat of being relieved of his
duty to support them.
IV. ADOPTION
One case involved the choice of law governing an adopted child's
right of inheritance; another concerned the jurisdictional elements for
adoption in this state.
In Delamotte v. Delamotte a child had been adopted in Missouri.
After the death of the adoptive father the child sought in Tennessee
to take by intestacy the estate of that father's sister. The local law
of Missouri gives to an adopted child the same legal position as a
natural child with the right to inherit from a brother or sister of the
adopting parent. The Tennessee adoption statute, Tennessee Code
Annotated section 36-126, gives no such right. The supreme court
held that the law of Tennessee should be applied and the adopted
child took nothing. The decision is in accord with the great weight of
authority that inheritance rights of an adopted child are determined
by the law governing succession to the property of the decedent, and
not by the law of the state of adoption.
The other adoption case, In re Van Huss' Petition,14 decided by a
sharply divided court, is an unfortunate one. A man in the United
States Navy married a woman who had a child by a former marriage,
and he filed a petition to adopt the child. The natural father had
never provided for the child and the department of public welfare
recommended the adoption as being in the best interest of the child.
With the petitioner a lifelong resident of Tennessee and with all the
parties residing in the state, it appeared to be a perfectly clear case.15
The trial judge raised the jurisdictional point, however, that as the
petitioner's service in the Navy had taken him out of the state for
13. 340 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn. 1960).
14. 338 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1960).
15. The attorney for the petitioner, Mr. George H. Lockett of Harriman,
in answer to the writer's inquiry, stated: "One of the unfortunate things
that occurs when a situation like this develops is that a lay person who is
not a student of the law is never able to understand how nor why they
should be deprived of exercising this law when the court finds that every-
thing favors the matter that they petition for but yet dismisses the case
because of wording of a statute. The trial judge attempted to explain to them
why he was having to do this and I also went to great length to, explain
it to them but I still feel they never completely understood the matter."
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part of the time, he did not meet what the judge believed to be a
requirement of unbroken physical presence for the preceding year.
The applicable adoption statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section
36-105, as amended in 1959, states:
[TIhe petitioner shall have lived, maintained a home and been physi-
cally present in Tennessee . . . for one (1) year next preceding the
filing of the petition without regard to petitioner's legal residence.
(Emphasis added.)
The majority of the supreme court upheld the decision below and
denied the petition for adoption. The division in the court rested
on a difference in the method used in construing statutes. The
language of the 1959 statute is unusual. The majority of the court
stated they could not "perceive the reason" for the language; yet
though the purpose could not be perceived the language was clear,
and under the plain meaning rule the court must hold the statute
required unbroken presence of the petitioner for the whole preceding
year. Chief Justice Prewitt dissented in an opinion in which Justice
Felts joined. The dissenting justices looked to the purpose of the
statute and, finding the purpose was to broaden, not to narrow, the
scope of permissible adoption, they found the statute satisfied.
It seems that the minority are right. Statutes, like other writ-
ings, are frequently couched in language that is not ideal. The
legislature is entitled to have the help of the courts in carrying out
the legislative purpose and to make good sense out of obscure
language, as could be done here by construing "and" as "or," a form
of interpretation frequently employed in ordinary speech. The Su-
preme Court of Tennessee has repeatedly applied this general prin-
ciple of interpretation, as the dissenting opinion points out in this
case, and as the whole court did in the first case discussed in this
note.16 In 1961 the General Assembly again amended the statute by
substituting "or" for "and" and modifying the language so that
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-105 now reads:
[Tihe petitioner or petitioners shall have lived or maintained a regular
place of abode in Tennessee, or on federal territory within the boundaries
of Tennessee for one (1) year next preceding the filing of the petition
without regard to the petitioner's legal residence.
The statute contains as well a further provision in aid of a petitioner
in military service.
16. Leggett v. Crossnoe, supra note 1. The same point was made in a recent
article by an outstanding English judge, the Master of the Rolls, in a quotation
from another court: "A great Scottish judge of modem times, Lord Dunedin,
has said: 'A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof
by a Court should be to cure that object, unless crucial omission or clear
direction'imakes that end unattainable.'" Lord Evershed, The Judicial Process
in Twentieth Cenury England, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 761, 769 (1961).
1168 [ VOL. 14
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Despite the statutory change the Van Huss decision is a continuing
threat. During the two years the 1959 statute was on the books there
were doubtless a considerable number of adoptions by adopting par-
ents who, on business or for pleasure, went outside of Tennessee
during the year preceding the filing of the petition. Are these adop-
tions subject to collateral attack for lack of jurisdiction, say by a
collateral relative of a deceased adopting parent who seeks to take
the property of the dead man by inheritance as against the adopted
child? It is the writer's impression, fortified by the opinion of Pro-
fessor Paul Sanders, that this injustice would fail, because the statute
as interpreted by the majority is unconstitutional. To take a parallel
situation, suppose a state statute granted the privilege to make a
will or to inherit, to legitimate or to adopt a child, but expressly
denied the privilege to any person who left the state within the
preceding year. Such a curtain hampering persons from leaving the
state for any reason, good or bad, would surely be struck down, as
Crandall v. Nevada17 indicates. That case involved a tax of one
dollar levied by the state of Nevada in 1865 upon every person leaving
the state by a common carrier. The Supreme Court of the United
States unanimously struck down the tax. Two of the justices stated
that the tax was a burden on interstate commerce. The majority
went on the broader ground that the tax was inconsistent with the
nature of our government. "The people of these United States con-
stitute one nation," said Justice Miller, and quoting from an earlier
opinion he continued: "We are all citizens of the United States, and
as members of the same community must have the right to pass and
repass through every part of it without interruption as freely as in
our own States."'18 We would scarcely be a people or a nation if
through the imposition of a minor tax, or through the forfeiture of
a major property or personal right as in the Van Huss case, a state
could hamper the freedom of movement of its citizens from state to
state. The Crandall case was decided before the ratification of the
fourteenth amendment. Today this sort of discrimination, with no
reason behind it that any of the justices in the Van Huss case could
perceive, would not meet the test of the due process and equal pro-
tection clause of the United States Constitution. There is an added
reason for the unconstitutionality of the result in the Van Huss case
itself. It imposed a burden on a member of the armed forces perform-
ing his national military duties,19 a ground of unconstitutionality in-
timated in the Crandall case.
17. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
18. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 49.
19. In the brief of counsel for the petitioner the point was explicitly made
that the petitioner "was only out of the state because of his service in the
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V. STATE SEIZURE OF INTANGIBLES
The Tennessee Unclaimed Funds Act for Life Insurance Companies,
Act of 1961, chapter 325, directs "any life insurance company doing
business" in the state to report and turn over to the Commissioner all
moneys owing by the life insurance company under an insurance
contract "where the last known address, according to the records of
such company, of the person entitled to such funds is within the State
of Tennessee." The statute provides methods of relief for insurance
claimants who may later turn up, and it does not extend to a "amounts
which have been paid to another jurisdiction prior to the effective
date of this Act." Seizures of this sort have been widely directed
by the states at unclaimed bank and telegraph company deposits,
corporate shares and dividends, and life insurance claims as here.
The contacts employed by the state as the basis for jurisdiction to
seize have varied widely. The Supreme Court of the United States
has upheld the seizure in numerous situations when the contest
was between the seizing state and the holder of the funds. It has
never faced the problem where different states, each with sub-
stantial contacts, sought to seize the same fund. As Justice Jack-
son put it in a dissenting opinion: 20 "While we may evade it for a
time, the competition and conflict between states for 'escheats' will
force us to some lawyerlike definition of state power over this sub-
ject."
United States Navy and had been aboard ship and could not establish a
residence anywhere else."
20. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
[ VOL.. 141170
